



DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY PLAN



This paper provides a conceptual framework for developing and sustaining partner nation whole-of government approaches and structures in support of Security Force Assistance operations in Foreign Internal Defense/Internal Defense and Development campaigns. It does *not* suggest a one-size-fits-all approach, as the strategy, operational approach, and tactical SFA support in building capacity is unique for each operational environment. This paper is informed by the experiences of Halcyon Group experts who provided advisory services from the Minister of Defense level to tactical levels in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia.

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Overview

This paper provides broad guidelines and 'best practices' for developing integrated security and governance plans and operations in a counterinsurgency environment. It provides an intellectual framework for civil-military integrated action (IA) and associated objectives, mechanisms, and synchronization activities which can be adjusted based upon the particular nuances of the operational environment in which we find ourselves. These thoughts are informed by Counterinsurgency and U.S. Security Force Assistance operations in Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Integrated action is the synchronization of security and non-security elements and initiatives in time/space to defeat an insurgency. The intellectual framework and understanding of IA is just as important as the techniques used to achieve the desired endstate conditions. The techniques will appropriately be adjusted based upon the operational environment and capabilities of Partner Nation (PN) security and non-security elements.

Although IA efforts should be nested from national to tactical levels and the tenants remain constant at all strata of government, this paper will focus on IA at the province and below level.

Significance of Integrated Action

While it is difficult to establish the organizations and coordinating mechanisms necessary to develop and execute an integrated action plan, assisting the PN effectively establish those mechanisms is a critical requirement. Absent IA planning and execution, security forces and non-security governmental agencies will continue to execute independent initiatives, but will not develop the mutually reinforcing benefits necessary to gain adequate and active popular support to degrade insurgent activity to acceptable levels.

Developing, resourcing, and executing an integrated governance and security plan is a requirement for short/mid-term stability, and long term effective governance. To that end, successful operations are predicated upon an effective IA approach that, in Afghanistan, includes representatives from Provincial leadership, line ministry representatives, and security forces in all phases – *to include the planning phase*.

There is not a simple operational template that can be applied in every District or Province as each environment will have its own unique dynamics – security situation, sources of instability, government structure and capacity, and levels of external support for insurgents are just a few of the many considerations. There are, however methods to increase synergies and effects through planned and integrated security and governance operations.

Security and Governance Mutual Support

Security and governance are inextricably woven into the counterinsurgency fabric and IA, and common, cross-ministry objectives are required for effective IA. Ultimately, the intent is to execute security operations in decisive or key terrain to allow governance to firmly take hold and enable the vertical penetration of government to the lowest level possible.

Although the adversary has many enablers and critical requirements - supporting infrastructure, safe havens, and consistent funding - a supportive or acquiescent population remains a requirement for insurgent freedom of maneuver and operations. The population does not need to overwhelmingly support the insurgency, but a lack of active popular resistance allows the adversary the freedom of maneuver and protection necessary to generate adequate levels of power to deny effective security and governance operations.

Effective IA is a critical GiROA capability necessary to generate popular support and ultimately degrade the enemy's internal supporting structures thorough focused governance and security operations.

"Peasants will support (the guerrillas)... if they are convinced that failure to do so will result in death or brutal punishment. They will support the government if and when they are convinced that it offers them a better life, and it can and will protect them against the guerrillas forever." - Simpson, Inside the Green Berets

It is the population that provides the supporting infrastructure for insurgent groups, and only when internal political, security and social conditions are adequately addressed by the legitimate government will popular support be denied, isolating the insurgents and forcing them to the negotiating table or allowing for their physical destruction.

This cannot be done solely through military action, as military operations conducted without other elements of government to address and mitigate the root causes of the insurgency will result in nothing more than a series of tactical victories that may degrade enemy capabilities, but in the end will only slow them and not result in strategic victory.

Likewise, addressing the problem with an application of strictly governmental social reforms may help, however without concurrent military operations the population may well be intimidated and

"It is the population that provides the supporting infrastructure for insurgent groups, and only when internal political, security and social conditions are adequately addressed by the legitimate government will popular support be achieved, isolating the insurgents and forcing them to the negotiating table or allowing for their physical destruction." - Draining the Terrorist Lake

coerced so as not to cooperate and support the legitimate government.

The answer partially lies in a comprehensive IA campaign that concurrently degrades terrorist capabilities and addresses the social and governance issues that enable popular support. The three areas discussed below identify common blockages to developing and executing a nested IA governance/security plan, and mitigating approaches.

Common Blockages



Aside from the dynamics of the operational environment, the most common blockages that prohibit effective IA are organizational in nature.

Some of these blockages are structural and can be accommodated through planning and leadership: for example separate budgets and funding streams for different agencies are a general constant in any government.

Other blockages are institutional in nature, and lead to inertia. It is those barriers to IA which we can influence for greater effects that are simultaneously enemy and population centric. To plan and execute an IA plan we must encourage horizontal integration, and develop integrated planning mechanisms to build comprehensive governance and security plans that enable GiROA security and non-security elements, operating together, to gain territorial control and hold that territory through focused, synchronized, and reinforcing enemy (direct approach) and population (indirect approach) efforts.

Vertical Stovepipes vs Horizontal Integration


Characteristically, organizations view their programs and initiatives through a stovepiped optic that focuses on their unique organizational capabilities and objectives, and does not optimize the same capabilities in a counterinsurgency fight. Ministry of Public Health officials focus on the number of Basic Health Clinics in a Province; Ministry of Education leaders worry about schools and qualified teachers. Security ministries concern themselves with building their capabilities and degrading those of the insurgent.

All of the above are appropriate as they are primary sectoral functions those ministries are expected to focus on and improve upon. The problem arises when the ministerial foci are stovepiped in both planning and execution without common cross-sectoral objectives, and lack the mutual reinforcement that occurs with horizontal integration of security and non-security organizations alike. From an IDAD and COIN perspective, planned and

synchronized cross-ministerial actions must leverage integrated capabilities in time and space to achieve lasting effects.

The slide on the left depicts the traditional model, and the manner in which we generally continue to plan and execute – stovepiped vertical programs planned and executed independent of larger, cross sectoral, population focused objectives. Independent organizations build their capabilities and programs without cross-sectoral planning and without focus on key terrain. Their end-state focused is internally (services) driven.

The slide on the right attempts to depict a much more effective approach – horizontal crosscutting planning and execution focused on combined security and governance operations that leverage the entirety of government capabilities to stabilize geographic areas. The security focus is enemy centric, and the non-security focus is population centric, with all capabilities generated to achieve specific and reinforcing effects in a designated piece of terrain. In this case the end state focus is externally (effects) driven.



Organizational Planning Mechanisms

While there are a number of capabilities necessary to plan and execute IA operations, the two most critical requirements are organizational acceptance or 'buy in' from the multiple security and non-security ministries alike, and a body with the *responsibility and authorities* to oversee coordinated security and governance efforts. The first requirement leads the second.

The first requirement, organizational acceptance, requires thought leadership and internal advocates. Ultimately, IA benefits all governmental players, although at times it some organizations may need to modify short-term tactical level objectives in favor of achieving longer term strategic end-state conditions. For example, a MoPH MEDCAP supported by security forces may not directly support MoPH immediate goals, however the access and

influence that such an event can produce may shorten the overall timeline necessary to institute a more formalized health care structure in the objective area in support of the Afghan National Development Strategy and National Priority Program clusters. These are common trade-offs necessary to institute an effective IA plan.

The second requirement, a planning body, is the critical capability that ensures unity of effort across security and non-security lines of effort. IA provides unity of effort, and in the absence of an organization that provides planning oversight, each discrete element will execute their programs independently of each other. The result is often a good amount of activity without the progress which is made possible by integrated security and governance planning and execution.

While preferable, establishing a formal integrated (and integrating) organization is much more difficult and time consuming than supporting ad-hoc, informal elements. In Afghanistan, some necessary basic structures already exist and can be leveraged. At the Provincial level, the OCC-P is the most logical body for performing the integrated planning and synchronization function, however it absolutely requires participation and leadership by the PGOV and line-ministry representatives in a focused effort during both planning and execution. Although this construct is limited by inadequate governmental budget processes and authorities that will not fully align with requirements, the benefits of such a body outweigh what may be unwieldy coordinating mechanisms.

Building a Comprehensive Integrated Action Plan

Building an IA plan is a top to bottom process, working down from Provincial to district and sub-district level. As with any plan, it requires a commander's vision – in this case a Governor's vision that will drive vertically nested operations, horizontally integrated operations, and well defined resource requirements that are objectives based.


Long term IA plans are necessary at Provincial level, which drive the ultimate governance and security objectives. District level plans will be driven by Provincial planning efforts. Under this construct, nested mid and short-term plans are developed for every operation, with the possible exception of those ANSF disruption operations that are designed without intent to 'hold' terrain and build governmental and supporting structures.

The above construct requires a deliberate planning process, and the participation of security and non-security official alike. Developing an integrated mission and vision coupled with a synchronization matrix are the first step in this process, with similar synchronization matrices incorporated into the ANSF operational plans.

The supporting synchronization matrix should include all organizations involved: security and non-security. Each organization has a task and purpose to support larger security and governance efforts – in fact the main effort will shift during the phases of an operation

from the security to the non-security organizations. Similarly, supported and supporting relationships between security and non-security elements will shift in time based upon the overall end-state objectives, the nature of the conflict and its dynamics, and the uneven organizational or absorptive capacities that may exist between ministries at any given time. The relations and roles of various partner nation organizations may also shift in space, with differing relationships at tactical vice strategic levels.

Integrated Action – the synchronization of governance and security operations – requires planning, execution, and appropriate authorities based upon a strategic whole-of-government perspective. Governance and security are not separate independent activities, and require comprehensive planning by all ministries involved. The critical horizontal coordination must be encouraged and facilitated through ongoing mentorship.



1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Halcyon Group International is uniquely qualified to provide support robust Security Force Assistance and other support to necessary to prepare for emerging threats and respond to ongoing efforts in complex operational environments. We are able to accomplish this very difficult mission by employing a team of “world class” subject matter experts (SMEs) with centuries of combined experience in Security Force Assistance, counterinsurgency, Special Operations, and Information Operations acquired through service in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) communities. Our highly talented team of professionals have been supporting overseas contingency and steady-state operations, focused on developing strategies in support of partner nations, and operationalizing those strategies through training and tactical implementation.

Halcyon Group has experienced in training, advising, and assisting partner nation military leadership in the CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM Areas of Responsibility, to include advising from the Minister of Defense to Platoon levels.

By recommending, designing, and supporting innovative technical and non-technical solutions for both population and enemy centric operations, we are able to influence integrated civilian and military campaign plans, and provide well-informed and timely insight to key military and civilian decision-makers. Halcyon’s Management Team, led by the 2008 Distinguished Graduate of the United States National War College, brings extensive experience operating in austere environments, and ensures unparalleled support through continuous communications, task synchronization, and program administration.

2 HALCYON FOCUS

The Halcyon focus is Security Force Assistance – building the capabilities of partner nations through a whole-of-government approach which encompass the integration and synchronization of both military and non-military organizations in order to achieve national strategic objectives. We primarily execute this through a strategy to task approach: that is identifying the strategic ends, and developing and tailoring the means necessary to achieve those ends. Our primary sub-focus areas, all nested with the strategic approach, are Information Operations, Counterinsurgency, Special Operations, and Stability Operations. These also require the supporting enabling capabilities necessary to achieve effects, and include technology, intelligence, training, and logistics systems.



The Halcyon cadre are unique in their field, with operational experience in every region of the world. This experience ranges from providing senior advisors at Ministerial levels, to Training, Advising, and Assisting tactical Special Operations and conventional forces in combat environments. Over 60% of our personnel have a Master’s degree, all have combat experience, and most have served in the Middle East and South Asia and are familiar with and have a deep appreciation for the culture, religion, and complex operational environments.

Halcyon also recruits and retains personnel from a very select group of highly trained, educated, and uniquely qualified former members of Special Operations Forces (SOF), selected General Purpose Forces (GPF), and accomplished professionals from U.S. Governmental departments and agencies, academia, and industry. Our personnel are fully vetted to provide advisory and assistance support individually or as part of a team operating in a distributed manner across the battle space. Our personnel bring demonstrated expertise in JIIM operations, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), the Interagency Management System, and embedded operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. We possess an unchallenged operational understanding of the Whole-of-Government approach combining Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) elements of national power to achieve regional security, stability, and prosperity.

3 HALCYON BACKGROUND

A Woman Owned Small Business Founded in 2009, Halcyon is committed to providing our clients with the highest level of quality support, on-schedule and timely responses, skilled and experienced personnel, and clear, concise, effective, and frequent communication. Our experienced management team ensures agility, and guarantees that projects will be visible at the highest levels of the Halcyon organization. Supporting current and previous client requirements that include the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Rapid Reaction Technology Office; providing advisors and mentors from the strategic to tactical level in the USCENTCOM AOR; and supporting Theater Security Cooperation Activities in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, Halcyon has a track record of developing dynamic and innovative solutions to complex and multi-faceted problem sets through combining both technical and non-technical approaches to support complex requirements.



4 CONTACT INFORMATION

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